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The Attitude of the Entente Powers to Gyula Peidl’s 
Government in Hungary (August 1919) – in the 
Spirit of Distrust, Unwillingness and Information 
Disorientation1
ANDREJ TÓTH
On 1 August 1919 the top political officials of the Hungarian Re-
public of Councils (Magyar Tanácsköztársaság), at the joint session of the 
“soviet” government, the Revolutionary Governing Council (Forradalmi 
Kormányzótanács) and the leaders of the joint party of the Hungarian so-
cial democrats and communists, the Party of Socialist-Communist Work-
ers of Hungary (Szocialista-Kommunista Munkások Magyarországi Párt-
ja), recognized the hopelessness of the military and foreign political situa-
tion of the Republic of Councils and passed the government of the country 
to the oppositional right-wing and centrist social democrats. They created 
the unicolour social-democratic government, to be led by Gyula Peidl, the 
leader of the right-wing social democrats, former minister of labour and 
social affairs of Berinkey’s2 cabinet of “Károlyi’s” republic, who had not 
agreed to the union of the Hungarian social democrats with the com-
munists on 21 March 1919, which had declared the Hungarian Republic of 
Councils together on the same day. That was the end of the 133 days of 
existence of the Hungarian Republic of Councils. As Peidl’s government 
consisted mostly of trade union leaders, it is also called “trade union” gov-
ernment.
The assumption of power by the right-wing and centrist social-
democratic trade union leaders was also indirect result of the July negotia-
tions of the opposition socialists with the Entente representatives in Vien-
na, aimed at peaceful removal of “Kun’s” government and its substitution 
by the unicolour social-democratic government, i.e. by a left-wing, but 
standard, civic cabinet. The July negotiations of the Hungarian opposition 
social democrats with the Entente representatives in Vienna were hold 
under the main leadership of Colonel Thomas Cuninghame, chief of the 
1 The article constitutes a part of solution of the Grant Project No. P410/10/P140, Czech-
oslovak-Hungarian bilateral relationships on the background of home affairs develop-
ment of Horthyan Hungary in 1919–1927, funded by the Grant Agency of the Czech 
Republic.
2 Dénes Berinkey’s government ruled from 11 January 1919 to 21 March 1919.
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British military mission to Vienna, and Vilmos Böhm, social-democratic 
centrist, the Hungarian envoy to Austria.3
But the negotiations of the Hungarian “rebelling” socialists with 
the Entente representatives in Vienna did not gain confidence and direct 
international support to their project by the representatives of the Entente 
Powers. The result of the session of the Supreme Council of the Paris 
Peace Conference on internal development in Hungary at the very end of 
the Republic of Councils consisted only in adoption of a neutrally formu-
lated declaration at its afternoon meeting of 26 July 1919. The top Entente 
officials at the Paris Peace Conference stated in their declaration that they 
did not wish to negotiate with a Budapest government that did not repre-
sent the Hungarian nation and violated the armistice and that the release of 
the blockage against Hungary together with food aid to the country and
support to economic restoration of the country was only possible if Hun-
gary was governed by a cabinet representing the Hungarian nation and not 
by a government whose authority was based on terror. Besides, it was for 
the first time after more than four months of the existence of the Hungari-
an Republic of councils that the Peace Conference declared categorically 
that it was definitely not willing to negotiate with the government of the 
Republic of Councils.4
So the declaration of the Peace Conference did not support any 
opposition direction against “Kun’s” regime and did not offer any guaran-
tee to the possible unicolour social-democratic cabinet of Hungary to be 
recognized by the Peace Conference. The neutrality of the declaration of 
the Peace Conference on the Hungarian issue, in response to the Vienna 
negotiations between the Entente representatives in Vienna and Böhm, the 
Hungarian envoy to Austria, was also confirmed in the telegram from 29 
3 The Hungarian diplomatic representation to Vienna was the first diplomatic mission of 
Budapest, enjoying the statute of embassy even before entering into the Peace Treaty 
with Hungary on 4 June 1920. For the above stated negotiations of the Hungarian social 
democrats in Vienna compare A. TÓTH, ????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, in: ??????????????, Vol. 12, 
2004 particularly pp. 97–109.
4 For the declaration of the Peace Conference see e.g. Papers Relating to the Foreign 
Relations of the United States. The Paris Peace Conference. 1919. (Hereinafter referred 
to only as “FRUS PPC”.) Vol. VII. The Council of Heads of Delegations: Minutes of 
Meetings July 1 to August 28, 1919, Washington, United States Government Printing 
Office 1946, minutes on point 2 of the session of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace 
Conference (hereinafter referred to only as “SC PPC”) on 26 July 1919 (Hungarian Af-
fairs), pp. 317–322, or pp. 321–322. For the wording of the declaration of the Paris Peace 
Conference see also the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Czech Republic 
[hereinafter referred to only as “AMZV”], Telegramy došlé [Delivered telegrams], 1919, 
(No. 1001–1200), No. 1037, circular from Paris from 27 July 1919; there the declaration 
wording in French.
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July 1919 by Vlastimil Tusar, the Czechoslovak Prime Minister, to Edvard 
Beneš, the Czechoslovak Foreign Minister staying in Paris. Tusar commu-
nicated to Beneš with regard to the above stated declaration that “the dec-
laration of the Allied governments on Hungary and Kun’s government is 
vague.”5 Nevertheless, the declaration of the Peace Conference granted 
some “mandate” to the efforts of the socialists to move the top political 
officials of the Republic of Councils to recognize the need to pass the 
government of the country in the interest of Hungary, and that “mandate”, 
although vague, could “legalize” their effort in front of die-hard advocates 
of the “soviet” regime.
Only Guido Romanelli, an Italian lieutenant colonel and head of 
the Italian military mission to Budapest, was available to Peidl’s govern-
ment for direct contact with the Entente representatives. The other Entente 
representatives, except for the representatives of the Italian military mis-
sion, had left Hungary immediately after the Hungarian “soviet” Republic
had been declared. But in spite of that, the Italian military mission to Bu-
dapest did not move the other Entente Powers to recognize it as the offi-
cial representative of the Entente to Hungary, because they feared the pos-
sible growth of the power role of Italy in the region.6
Virtually immediately, on 1 August 1919, after the consultations 
with the new political representatives, Romanelli informed Georges-
Benjamin Clemenceau, the president of the Supreme Council of the Paris 
Peace Conference, about the change of regime in Hungary based on the 
Vienna agreements between the Vienna Entente representatives, specifi-
cally between Prince Livio Borghese, the Italian Entente representative, 
and Sir Cuninghame, the head of the British military mission. Their merit 
was the deposition of the “soviet” system and its substitution by a tempo-
rary regime to lead the country until the composition of the governmental 
cabinet with the representatives of all social classes under the surveillance 
of an Entente commission and during which the Entente would release the 
blockade against Hungary and adopt immediate actions for delivery of 
food and coal to the country and restore the suspended Danube navigation. 
Böhm, the Hungarian envoy to Austria, was to assume the leadership of 
the temporary regime. But the proposals of the Vienna Entente representa-
tives that would lead to normalization of relationships between Hungary 
and the Entente Powers had emerged without consulting the Peace Con-
ference. Therefore the Conference did not adopt them as basis for solution 
5 AMZV, Paris Archive [hereinafter “PA”], book No. 87 (No. 10281–10838), doc. No. 
10401 [the same doc.: book No. 85 (No. 10034–10222), doc. No. 10099].
6 The issue of the activity of the Italian military mission to Hungary is studied in more 
detail by: Zs. L. NAGY, Az olasz érdekek és Magyarország 1918–1919-ben, in: Tör-
ténelmi Szemle, Vol. 8, No. 2, 1965, pp. 256–274; see particularly pp. 263–273.
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of the Hungarian issue and at its above stated session of 26 July, it did not 
express addressed support to the rebelling Hungarian social democrats and 
grant them the necessary international political mandate to overthrow the 
socialist-communist government, in spite of the fact that the fragile inter-
nal situation of the Hungarian “soviet” Republic by the end of July seemed 
extremely convenient for liquidation of “Kun’s” regime from inside, with-
out needing an external military intervention.7
The international political support to the new Hungarian Cabinet 
played a key role in it. Not only from the perspective of its internal situa-
tion. The primary and most delicate task of the new Hungarian Govern-
ment was to stop the march of the Rumanian army to Budapest. Immedi-
ately before the fall of the Republic of Councils, on 30 July 1919, the Ru-
manians had crossed the Tisza River that had separated the Hungarian and 
Rumanian armies from the turn of April and May, near the town of 
Szolnok without authorization of the Entente Powers and had started ad-
vancing towards Budapest. As the Rumanian army was an allied army 
fighting against the Hungarian “soviet” government, it was necessary to 
gain foreign political support to the new Hungarian Cabinet as soon as 
possible, or to move the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference 
to command Bucharest immediately to stop the advance of its army on the 
capital of Hungary. Romanelli’s telegram to Paris, informing the Peace 
Conference of the assumption of power by the new government in Buda-
pest, included therefore the proposal of a bilateral armistice between the 
Hungarian and Rumanian army aimed at stopping mutual hostility, stop-
ping the advance of the Rumanians towards the capital of Hungary and 
delimiting the temporary demarcation line between the two armies.8
Also the Vienna Entente representatives tried to help the new Hun-
garian Government to achieve international political recognition by the 
Peace Conference. The negotiations of Vilmos Böhm, the Hungarian en-
voy to Vienna, and Jakab Weltner, the opposition social democrat with the 
Vienna Entente representatives, took place in the evening of 1 August 
1919 already. On the day of removal of “Kun’s” government, they met 
7 For the agreed conditions of the possible agreement between the Entente Powers and the 
representatives of the rebelling Hungarian social democrats see FRUS PPC, VII., Annex 
A to point 3 of the morning session of SC PPC on 26 July 1919 (Hungarian Affairs), p. 
310 or Documents on British Foreign Policy 1910–1939, First Series. Volume I–X, Lon-
don 1947–1960 [hereinafter referred to only as “DBFP”], Her Majesty’s Stationery Of-
fice, Vol. IV., London 1952, doc. No. 57, p. 90.
8 Compare e.g.: FRUS PPC, VII., Annex A to point 1 of the session of SC PPC on 2 
August 1919 (Situation in Hungary), pp. 489–490 (Romanelli’s telegram in English here) 
or DBFP, Vol. I., London 1947, p. 7930 (Romanelli’s telegram in French here). For 
Romanelli’s telegram see also AMZV, PA, book 41, microfiche No. 1 (No. 4489–4551), 
doc. No. 4534, fol. 2 (Romanelli’s telegram in French here too).
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Colonel Cuninghame, the head of the British military mission to Vienna 
and Prince Livio Borghese, the Italian Entente representative. On 2 Au-
gust, another meeting was held, that time only with Borghese. The talks 
resulted in intervention of Henri Allizé, the French envoy to Vienna, and 
Colonel Cuninghame, the chief of the Vienna British military mission at 
the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference in order to release the 
blockade of Hungary. Böhm, the Hungarian envoy to Austria, met, togeth-
er with Weltner, also the representative of the United States to Vienna, 
Captain Thomas Gregory, authorized representative of the American mis-
sion for post-war help to Europe or the head of the Agency for Supply to 
Central Europe, respectively. But, according to Böhm’s statement, they 
did not negotiate about political issues with him, but only about economic 
issues, or more exactly about the release of the blockade of Hungary. They 
asked him to assist the Hungarian Government in the issue of solution of 
the catastrophic supply of foodstuffs to the country.9
The Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference dealt with 
Romanelli’s telegram at its meeting of 2 August. Both the Italian and the 
British Prime Minister, Tommaso Titoni and Arthur James Balfour, point-
ed out that the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference itself had not 
created any conditions to Hungary, and therefore had not committed itself 
towards Hungary in any way. Balfour stressed that the internal matters of 
Hungary should not be any of business of the Peace Conference, and 
therefore it should not set the condition that Hungary had an ordinary gov-
ernment, or how the Hungarian Government should look like, respective-
ly. Also Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference, stressed that 
on 26 July 1919, the Supreme Council had agreed that the arrangements 
agreed in Vienna between Böhm and Prince Borghese did not commit the 
Peace Conference in any way. He reminded at the same time that the En-
tente had not recognized Böhm officially.10
9 B. KIRSCHNER, A „szakszervezeti kormány“ hat napja, Budapest 1968, pp. 172–173 
and W. BÖHM, or V. BÖHM, Im Kreuzfeuer zweier Revolutionen, München 1924, p. 
528. See also Böhms private report from Vienna to Ágoston, the Hungarian foreign min-
ister, from 5 August 1919 in Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára (hereinafter referred to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ????????????????????????????Ágoston Péter külügyi megbízatásai idején keletkezett 
iratok. [Documents created during Péter Ágoston’s activity in the services of the ministry 
of foreign affairs]. See Böhm’s report from 5 August 1919: Kibontakozási tárgyalások
[Negotiation aimed at solution of the situation in Hungary; the file includes three differ-
ent summary reports by Böhm from Vienna, dated 5 August 1919] to Ágoston, the for-
eign minister (the report was sent also to Peidl, the minister president; compare ibidem, 
fol. 43) fol. 43–47, or 44–47.
10 FRUS PPC, VII., point 1 of the agenda of the session of SC PPC on 2 August 1919 
(Situation in Hungary), pp. 480–483; see also DBFP, I./I., doc. No. 26, pp. 294–297.
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But the Entente representatives realized that, on account of the fall 
of the Budapest “soviet” government, the Rumanian military action be-
came ungrounded. Both the British and the Italian foreign ministers ex-
pressed identically that the Rumanians had to be called by the Supreme 
Council to stop the advance of their army and that the Rumanians – as 
Balfour expressed it – “must obey.”11 But Tittoni, the Italian foreign min-
ister, proposed their stopping at the line achieved by them at the moment, 
and not their immediate withdrawal beyond the Rumanian-Hungarian bor-
der declared in June. Tittoni proposed to send the call of withdrawal of the 
Rumanian army beyond the Rumanian-Hungarian border to Bucharest 
only, “if the Hungarians gave evidence of good behaviour.“12
But the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference refused 
Romanelli’s demand on behalf of the new Hungarian Government to be 
allowed to make bilateral armistice between Hungary and Rumania. But 
the new armistice was refused not only by the British foreign minister13
but also by Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference. Clemen-
ceau refused it with the substantiation that the only valid armistice was the 
armistice made between the Entente Powers and Hungary in Belgrade on 
13 November 1918.14 The British foreign minister also stressed that “he 
would adhere strictly to the armistice [understand as the Belgrade Armi-
stice – A. T.], and call on the Hungarians to observe it.“15 So the issue of 
stopping the Rumanian army, or the issue of their final withdrawal beyond 
the defined Hungarian-Rumanian border, promised by the Supreme Coun-
cil to Garbai’s “soviet” cabinet already, was unconditionally linked to the 
condition of disarmament of Hungary according to the provisions of Bel-
grade Armistice.
The answer of the President of the Supreme Council of the Paris 
Peace Conference to Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli, the head of the Italian 
military mission to Budapest, corresponded to the above stated moments 
of the Council negotiations from 2 August. Additionally to the formal in-
troduction of the text of the telegram confirming that the Supreme Council 
of the Peace Conference had taken notice of the resignation of the “soviet” 
government in Hungary and the creation of the new government, the 
Council announced to the Hungarian Government through Romanelli: 
“The Allied Council is of the opinion that it has no reason for interfering 
in the domestic politics of the Hungarian Republic and hence cannot take 
into consideration the proposals suggested by the two members of the Allied
11 FRUS PPC, VII., ibidem, p. 481.
12 Ibidem, p. 482.
13 Ibidem, p. 481.
14 Ibidem.
15 Ibidem, p. 482.
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Missions at Vienna.” The Peace Conference alerted the new Hungarian 
Cabinet that the base of the proportion between the Allied and Associated 
Powers and Hungary consisted of: “1) the armistice of November 13, 
1918, the conditions of which must be respected by the new Hungarian 
Government, particularly concerning the demobilization of the army; 2) 
the notification of the Peace Conference of June 13 for the establishment 
of a line on which the Hungarian troop must be kept in the direction of the 
Czecho-Slovak and Rumanian frontier.” In case of requirement on stop-
ping of the advance of the Rumanian army, Paris communicated the fol-
lowing to Budapest: “The Allied Council will only ask the Rumanian Gov-
ernment to stop its troops in the positions that they now occupy by reason 
of the aggression on the part of the Hungarian Army, and it will not ask 
the Rumanians to withdraw until the new Government at Budapest has 
conformed strictly to the terms of the armistice.”16
The Peace Conference did not support the new Hungarian Gov-
ernment. The supreme Entente representatives negotiating in Paris wasted, 
through their approach to the newly established internal situation in Hun-
gary, another chance to finally correct the chaotic post-war development 
inside Hungary at the session of the Council on 2 August already. The 
conditions established at the end of July in Vienna between the local En-
tente representatives and Böhm, the Hungarian envoy, were not recog-
nized as “Entente-like” by the Supreme council, although the Italian for-
eign minister reminded the Council that the Entente representatives in Vi-
enna had in spite of that been instructed by the Supreme Council to con-
tinue the initiated July negotiations with Böhm, resulting in some pro-
posals approved by Böhm.17 So none of the parties, i.e. neither the Hun-
garian nor the Rumanian government, lived to see a real conclusion of the 
Supreme Council with regard to the development in Budapest that would 
clearly define both the foreign political and the internal statute of the 
changes in Hungary. The existence of a stable Hungarian Government was 
unthinkable without the Entente’s blessing, not only from foreign political 
but of course also from internal perspective. The only “forthright” state-
ment of the Peace Conference towards the new social-democratic govern-
ment in Budapest said: “The Allied and Associated Powers are waiting for 
the new Hungarian Government to prove itself by its acts, and they hope, 
that the ascendancy of a Government which will carry out its pledges and 
will represent the Hungarian nation will hasten the moment of the reestab-
16 FRUS PPC, VII., Annex B to point 1 of the session of SC PPC on 2 August 1919 (Sit-
uation in Hungary), p. 490.
17 Compare FRUS PPC, VII., point 1 of the session of SC PPC on 2 August 1919 (Situa-
tion in Hungary), p. 483.
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lishment of peace and the resumption of regular economic relations.“18
Nevertheless, one party profited from the prejudiced attitude of the Su-
preme Council of the Peace Conference to the Hungarian issue. It was 
Rumania that could, thanks to the sluggishness of the Entente Powers, 
make use of the wait-and-see attitude of the Peace Conference as against 
the new government in Budapest and run a risk – keep advancing quickly 
towards the Hungarian capital and occupy it.
The Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference needed to be 
reproached that, after having received the telegram from Romanelli, the 
Italian lieutenant colonel, from Budapest from 1 August describing the 
internal changes occurred in Hungary, it did not take specific interest in 
the character and the composition of the new government and only sent a 
message to Budapest that it would await the first steps of the newly estab-
lished cabinet. So the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference discussed 
the new situation in Hungary only based on very fragmentary messages 
distorting the new situation of Hungary. The Peace Conference was only 
notified of the establishment of the new government that wanted to estab-
lish negotiations with the Entente, with which, nevertheless, also the “so-
viet” government had tried to negotiate, not only through the Vienna En-
tente representatives. Only after the session of the Council on 2 August, 
the information of the personnel composition of the new government in 
Budapest arrived to Paris. It is however interesting that the Peace Confer-
ence was informed about the personnel composition of the new Budapest 
government not by Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli, but by the French 
command at Nagy Kikinda,19 or by General Paul de Lobit, commander of 
the French army in Hungary,20 who had sent that information to Paris in 
his telegraphic message from 3 August 1919.21 But it is true that a relevant 
picture of the declared change of regime in Hungary was not provided to 
the Entente representatives at the Peace Conference even by the declara-
tion of the Hungarian Government to the Hungarian people from 1 August 
1919, although it had referred to the initiated negotiations with the Entente 
Powers; the declaration was available to the Supreme Council only at its 
18 Compare FRUS PPC, VII., Annex B to point 1 of the session of SC PPC on 2 August 
1919 (Situation in Hungary), pp. 490–491.
19 Contemporary Kikinda in Serbia.
20 During the Hungarian “soviet” republic, a small part of today’s southeastern Hungary 
including the town of Szeged was occupied by French army.
21 Compare Documents diplomatiques français sur l’histoire du Bassin des Carpates. M. 
ÁDÁM, Gy. LITVÁN, M. ORMOS (Eds.), Budapest, Vol. I–III, 1993–1999. [Hereinaf-
ter referred to only as “DDFBC”], Vol. II., Août 1919–Juin 1920, 1995, doc. No. 7 (tele-
gram of General Paul de Lobit, the commander of the French army in Hungary, from 3 
August 1919), pp. 10–11.
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session on 4 August 1919, again thanks to the French command of Nagy 
Kikinda. The new Hungarian Government declared its establishment in 
charge of the central workers’ council under support of the organized 
working class in it.22 But even though, the fact that the new Hungarian 
Government re-established the system of government of the country from 
16 November 1918 in its first Government Decree No. 1/1919. ME. indi-
cated relatively clearly a lot of things. The Government Decree deter-
mined that the system of government of Hungary was people’s republic
and reintroduced the official name of the country, People’s Republic of 
Hungary.23
The situation in Hungary, particularly with regard to the issue of 
the Rumanian military presence in the country, was discussed by the Su-
preme Council of the Peace Conference again at its subsequent session of 
4 August,24 i.e. on the day when the gradual capitulation of Budapest to 
the Rumanian army had started. Herbert Clark Hoover, the head of the 
American mission for post-war help to Europe and future president of the 
United States, informed at the very beginning of the session the Council 
about the current occupation of Budapest by the Rumanian army.25 The 
current situation of Hungary caused by the quick advance of the Rumanian 
army towards the capital of the country was later confirmed also by Frank 
Lyon Polk, the chief of the American delegation to the Peace Conference. 
Based on the news about the situation in Hungary at two o’clock PM (4 
August),26 he informed the Council that 600 Rumanian cavalrymen pene-
trated the western part of Budapest, cutting off all roads to Vienna there.27
A thing not expected by the Entente representatives had occurred. Their 
ally, without their agreement, alone and on his own, advanced quickly 
with a clear goal, to occupy Budapest, the capital of Hungary. So the cer-
tainty of the Peace Conference believing that the Rumanians would not 
dare such step that would set their powerful friends against them, as had 
22 See FRUS PPC, VII., Annex B to point 1 of the session of Supreme Council on 2 Au-
gust 1919 (Situation in Hungary), pp. 516–517 or DDFBC, II., doc. No. 8, pp. 11–12 
(here the declaration of the new Hungarian Government to the people in French).
23 See Magyar Országos Levéltár [MOL], K 26, Miniszterelnökség [Government; herein-
after referred to only as “ME.”], 1203. cs., 1919 – I. – 3887, fol. 2–3 (Government De-
cree of Peidl’s government for the Official Bulletin) or Hivatalos Közlöny (Official Bul-
letin), No. 109 from 3 August 1919, front page.
24 For the discussion of SC PPC on the situation in Hungary at its session on 4 August 
1919 see FRUS PPC, VII., point 1 of the referred session of SC PPC (Situation in Hun-
gary), pp. 504–511.
25 In l. 1929–33.
26 The session of SC PPC was started at half past three PM. Compare FRUS PPC, VII., 
point 1 of the agenda of the session of SC PPC on 4 August 1919, p. 504.
27 Ibidem, point 1 of the session of SC PPC on 4 August 1919, p. 507.
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informed even his own government, Edvard Beneš, the Czechoslovak for-
eign minister staying in Paris, proved erroneous.28
The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had even the an-
swer of the new Hungarian Cabinet to the telegram of the Council from 2 
August, mediated by the Italian Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli, at its ses-
sion of 4 August 1919 already. The new Hungarian Government commit-
ted itself at the Peace Conference to comply with the conditions of Bel-
grade Armistice in as short period as possible, asking the Peace Confer-
ence at that occasion that the Allied and Associated Powers assist Hungary 
at meeting the armistice conditions by sending the Entente army to the 
country including one regiment of each of the Allied Powers. Budapest did 
not consider that demand a request for intervention and alerted that it 
would only be a step allowing the country particularly free expression of 
its will.29
The Supreme Council of the Peace Conference was put into a deli-
cate situation by the behaviour of Bucharest. Although the head of the 
British diplomacy defended the Rumanians, he pointed out that the Hun-
garians had declared fulfilment of the conditions of the Belgrade Armi-
stice, and therefore, as he expressed it, “the Council was therefore bound 
to give them an opportunity of proving that they meant what they said.“30
And he even added: “It was not giving them a fair chance to send Rouma-
nians to plunder [! – A. T.] the suburbs of Budapest.“31 Also Polk, the 
head of the American peace delegation, opposed the behaviour of Bucha-
rest, stating that the Rumanians did not feel any respect towards the Peace 
Conference. Polk even reproached the Rumanians for not behaving in 
compliance with the generally valid laws of war in Hungary. He even 
warned that if the Supreme Council allowed the Rumanians to plunder 
Budapest, they would risk the loss of the positive response to Kun’s depo-
sition in the country. Polk invited therefore the Council to warn Bucharest 
that the Peace Conference would not tolerate any misuse of the position 
gained by them in Hungary. Balfour and Clemenceau expressed their con-
sent to Polk. Therefore the Supreme Council finally warned the Bucharest 
government officially by telegraph against the undesirable impact of any 
28 Compare Beneš’ telegram to Prague to Tusar, the Prime Minister, from 30 August 
1919. AMZV, PA, book No.. 83, (No. 9306–9690), doc. No. 9509.
29 For the answer of the Hungarian Government to the telegram of SC PPC from 2 Au-
gust 1919 through Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli compare annex A on the discussed 
point of the session of SC PPC on 4 August 1919, ibidem, p. 516 or DBFP, I./I., Annex A 
to doc. No. 27 (the same point of the same session of SC), p. 318 (here the document in 
French).
30 Ibidem, pp. 507–508.
31 Ibidem, p. 508.
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possible incidents of the Rumanian units in Budapest or wherever else in 
Hungary on fast restoration of peace in Central Europe, which could deep-
en infinite suffering of their inhabitants and at the same time, delay mark-
edly the economic reconstruction of the region. The Entente representa-
tives placated Bucharest in that context that they had been assured by the 
Budapest Cabinet that it was ready to keep the disarmament obligation 
according to the Belgrade Armistice from November 1918 and that it 
looked with favour on the cooperation with the Entente and Associated 
Powers.32
So the Supreme Council of the Peace Conference had the applica-
tion of the Hungarian Government to send the Entente army to Hungary 
and the declaration of submission to the Belgrade Armistice on the table. 
Sending of the required military control to the country in the form of an 
Allied mission was supported immediately by Tittoni, the Italian foreign 
minister.33 He was joined also by Polk, the chief of the American peace 
delegation.34 But at the moment, the Entente was not able to send an inter-
allied military force to Hungary consisting of one regiment from each Al-
lied Power. Only an inter-allied mission composed of Entente generals, 
accompanied by one company per each Entente Power, as proposed by 
Tittoni, the Italian foreign minister, came into consideration. According to 
Marshal Ferdinand Foch, the proposed inter-allied mission should control 
the situation in the country firmly and restrict the impacts of the Rumanian 
occupation to the indispensable minimum.35 The French foreign minister 
reminded, with respect to the status of the inter-allied military mission, 
that in such way, the situation before the assumption of power in Hungary 
by the socialist-communist cabinet would be restored. Then the Entente 
military mission, led by Ferdinand Vix, French lieutenant colonel, would 
operate in Hungary with the same goal, to control the observance of the 
Belgrade Armistice by the Hungarian Government.36
But the representatives of the Entente Powers were aware, with re-
gard of the arbitrary advance of the Allied Rumania, of the danger of igno-
rance of the planned inter-allied control military mission by the Rumanian 
Government and doubted the efficiency of the “moral influence” of the 
mission on the Rumanians in Hungary, as Clemenceau, the President of 
32 Ibidem, pp. 508–509; for the telegram of SC PPC to the Bucharest Government see 
ibidem, Annex C to the discussed point of the agenda of the session SC PPC on 4 August 
1919 In: ibidem, pp. 516 or DBFP, I./I., Annex C to doc. No. 27 (minutes of the session 
of SC PPC on 4 August 1919), p. 319.
33 Ibidem, point 1 of the session of the Supreme Council on 4 August 1919, p. 507.
34 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem, p. 509.
36 Ibidem.
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the Peace Conference, expressed with respect to the purpose of the inter-
allied mission.37 Therefore, when the Supreme Council informed Bucha-
rest about its decision to send a mission of Entente generals to Budapest to 
supervise the promised fulfilment of the Belgrade Armistice by the Hun-
garian Government, it had to invite the Rumanian Government at the same 
time to order the command of its units in Hungary to respect the inter-
allied mission that would represent the Peace Conference and act under its 
authority.38
So the Hungarian issue after the fall of the “soviet” regime in the 
country and the accession of the new government in Budapest became the 
Rumanian issue, under the pressure of the current development. The pre-
cipitous course of events in Hungary was not favourable to fast stabiliza-
tion of the country governed by the Hungarian social democrats. Also the 
restricted possibilities of communication with the top representatives of 
the Entente Powers at the Peace Conference in Paris constituted consider-
able flaw. “Credible” representatives of the Entente Powers as well as di-
rect mediators and witnesses of current internal events were missing in the 
country.
The attitude of the Entente to the new Hungarian Cabinet was fur-
ther waiting and neutral, although the Entente representatives had quite 
specific news on the composition of the new Hungarian Cabinet on 4 Au-
gust 1919 already, also thanks to Hoover, the head of the American mis-
sion for post-war help to Europe, who passed the information on the new 
Hungarian Government at the beginning of the session of the Supreme 
Council, having received the information from the plenipotentiary of the 
American mission for post-war help to Europe, or the head of the Office 
for supply to Central Europe in Vienna, Captain Gregory. Hoover, in spite 
of the illegibility of the non-standard Hungarian “trade-union” government 
consisting also of former prominent persons of “Kun’s” regime, pointed 
out that the Cabinet was represented by the opposition trade unions, and 
that he thought in that context that the trade unions could succeed in elim-
inating Bolshevism from the country. In case that estimate of him corre-
sponded to reality, he proposed the Council to support the new Hungarian 
government. But great importance had that part of Hoover’s speech in which 
he informed the Supreme Council, based on his news from Vienna that the 
new Budapest Cabinet could be extended with smallholders in short, trans-
forming the new Hungarian Government into a coalition government that 
37 Ibidem, p. 509.
38 Compare the telegram of SC PPC to the Bucharest Government, ibidem, see the above 
referred Annex C to the discussed point of the session of SC PPC on 4 August 1919, pp. 
516 or DBFP, I./I., Annex C to doc. No. 27 (minutes of the session of SC PPC on 4 Au-
gust 1919), p. 319.
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would represent broader social classes. With reference to such expecta-
tions, Hoover pointed out that under such assumptions, the new Hungarian 
Cabinet could substitute a real deputy government.39
The new Hungarian government headed by Gyula Peidl really 
started fulfilling promptly its declaration of its temporariness and its goal 
to create a temporary broader coalition cabinet. On 2 August already, the 
new Prime Minister invited István Szabó Nagtádi, the leader of the small-
holders, to negotiations. On 3 August, the Prime Minister approached Ká-
roly Huszár, the Christian-socialist leader, future prime minister of the so
called concentration cabinet, the first Hungarian government recognized 
by the Entente Powers. So the temporary unicolour socialist government 
wanted to strive to restore the civic democratic regime from the times of 
“Károlyi’s” republic, in cooperation with the smallholders and Christian 
socialists. At the same time, the envoy Böhm negotiated with the so called 
Anti-Bolshevik Committee (ABC) in Vienna. Márton Lovászy and Count 
István Bethlen from ABC asserted the negotiations with the diplomatic 
representative of the new Hungarian Government to Vienna. The meeting 
between Bethlen, the top representative of ABC, and Böhm took place 
under the auspices of Cunningham, the head of the British military mis-
sion to Vienna, and under participation of Reginald Gorton, a British gen-
eral, future British representative to the inter-allied control mission of the 
Entente generals to Budapest, on 4 August 1919. But the talks did not lead 
to a satisfactory result. The seriousness of Peidl’s government regarding 
the democratic reconstruction of Hungary is evidenced also by the fact 
that, on 2 August 1919 already, Péter Ágoston, the Hungarian foreign min-
ister, called the election of the constituent assembly of the country the first 
step towards the return of the country back to democratic principles. 
Peidl’s government really did not hesitate to prepare the first post-war 
parliamentary elections and informed even the Vienna Entente representa-
tives about it (see below). Already at its session of 3 August 1919, it 
claimed allegiance to the modern election law of Berinkey’s Cabinet from 
Károlyi’s era, and at the same time the council of ministers authorized the 
minister of the interior to execute all actions needed to call the parliamen-
tary election in the country.40
39 FRUS PPC, VII., point 1 of the agenda of the session of SC PPC on 4 August 1919, p. 
504.
40 Compare J. GERGELY, A keresztényszocializmus Magyarországon 1903–1923, Buda-
pest, 1977, pp. 136–137; Böhm informed Budapest of the negotiations with Bethlen in 
Vienna in one of his summarizing reports from 5. 8. See PIL, 689. f.??????????, Böhm’s 
report from 5. 8. 1919: Politikai ügyek [Political matters] to Ágoston, the foreign minister 
(the report was sent also to Peidl, the minister president; compare ibidem, fol. 48), fol. 
49–54; see also BÖHM, pp. 529–533; Gy. FÖLDES, L. HUBAI et al, Parlamenti vála-
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Nevertheless, although it was known at the scene of the Peace Conference 
already during the session of the Council on 4 August 1919 that the new 
Budapest Cabinet consisted exclusively of social democrats, the new Hun-
garian Government was further related to the Bolshevik regime and thus 
considered dubious, due to joint reign of the socialists with the Com-
munists in the period of the Republic of Councils or rather due to the en-
gagement of some members of Peidl’s Cabinet in the “soviet” regime.41
That very simplified picture of the new Budapest Cabinet was supported 
in Paris by some Entente representatives. For example W. L. O. Twiss, a 
British lieutenant colonel,42 questioned in his report to Harold Nicolson, 
the secretary of the British peace delegation to the Peace Conference, 
completely the new Hungarian Government, based on the reports received 
by him, called it Bolshevik and stated literally: “I do not believe that the 
Hungarian people wants Böhm, Peidl, Garami and their accomplices to 
govern them.”43 So Twiss tarred all members of Peidl’s cabinet with the 
same brush as the communists, including the new Prime Minister.
With regard to the issue of the level of information of the Supreme 
Council about the form of change of regime in Hungary, it is surprising 
that it did not get the information about the new political course of Hunga-
ry in such extent as the Entente representatives to Vienna had it. The re-
port sent to Budapest by Böhm, the Hungarian envoy to Vienna, shows us 
that after the creation of the unicolour social-democratic cabinet in Hunga-
ry, upon call of Peidl, the new Prime Minister and the foreign minister, the 
envoy gave the corresponding official news about the changes of the gov-
ernment in Budapest to the Entente emissaries.44 The Vienna Entente rep-
resentatives got, virtually immediately, clear information from Böhm, the 
Hungarian envoy to Austria, that the Revolutionary Governing Council in 
Hungary was substituted by a cabinet based on democratic principles that 
stopped political persecution from the era of the “soviet” regime and 
sztások Magyarországon 1920–1998. Budapest, 1999 [2], p. 50; MOL, K 27, ME., Min-
isztertanács [Council of Ministers; MT.], 3 August 1919 (box No. 122), p. 3.
41 The new Hungarian Cabinet (consisting of twelve members including the Prime Minis-
ter) included four members of the top socialist-communist executive body, Revolutionary 
Governing Council in total. Five ministers of Peidl’s Cabinet were members of the su-
preme “soviet” administrative body, Central Union Directory. Only three Cabinet mem-
bers, including the Prime Minister, had not engaged in any way during the “soviet” re-
gime.
42 Member of the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. He received the mes-
sages addressed to the British peace delegation, completed them with his own statements 
and passed them on. Compare L. ARDAY, Térkép csata után. Magyarország a brit kül-
politikában (1918–1919), Budapest, p. 142.
43 From Twiss’ message, quoted from ibidem, p. 261.
44 Compare PIL, last quoted doc., fol. 44 and BÖHM, p. 527.
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released its victims; cancelled all “terrorist orders”; stopped all Bolshevik 
propaganda both in Hungary and abroad; cancelled all contacts with Sovi-
et Russia; considered it an obligation to hold ordinary parliament election 
based on free expression of political opinions of the citizens, which it also 
started preparing at the same time; recognized and claimed allegiance to 
the obligation to fulfil the provision of the Belgrade Armistice from 13 
November 1918; had the only goal to keep order and peace in the country 
and restore economic life and therefore asked the Entente Powers primari-
ly for political recognition and release of the blockade against Hungary.45
But the Supreme Council did not grant political recognition to the 
Hungarian Government. The Peace Conference was forthcoming towards 
Hungary in only one essential thing. At Hoover’s request, it proceeded to 
release the blockade against Hungary, to reopen the Hungarian section of 
the Danube for international navigation and to supply Budapest with food 
from the Banat, the territory passed to the Kingdom of Serbians, Croatians 
and Slovenians. Captain Gregory, the plenipotentiary of the American 
mission for post-war help to Europe to Vienna, who had been specially 
asked for the cancellation of the blockade by Böhm, the Hungarian envoy 
to Austria, had certainly considerably share in that request.46 Hoover, at 
asserting the release of the blockade against Hungary and of the related 
further proposals at the Supreme Council, reproached the Peace Confer-
ence for not having released the blockade immediately. The head of the 
American mission for post-war help to Europe pointed out that it was just 
the release of the blockade, the restoration of the navigation on the Dan-
ube and the provision of supply of foodstuffs to Budapest that meant prac-
tical fulfilment of the policy of the Peace Conference towards the Buda-
pest Government, declared in the answer of the Council to Romanelli’s 
telegram from 1 August 1919, because the Entente Powers would get an 
efficient tool to control the situation in the country in the possibility to 
threaten the Hungarian Government with restoring the blockade.47
But what the Supreme Council underestimated considerably was 
the presence of the Rumanian army in Hungary. The Supreme Council of 
the Paris Peace Conference did not impose a ban on the occupation of Bu-
dapest by the Rumanian army; on the contrary, by inviting the Rumanian 
royal army to avoid any incidents during occupation of Budapest or Hun-
gary and to submit to the control Entente mission, it agreed indirectly with 
actual occupation not only of the capital. That happened although Paris 
knew already about the inadmissible behaviour of the Rumanian units in 
45 Compare PIL, ibidem, fol. 44 or BÖHM, pp. 527–528.
46 PIL, ibidem, fol. 44 and 46–47.
47 FRUS PPC, VII., point 1 of the session of SC PPC on 4 August 1919, p. 505.
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Hungary in form of not only taking captives, but also wilful murdering of
civil population, about which Entente circles were unformed already.48
The fast move of events in Hungary confirmed very quickly the 
voices warning against the lack of controllability of the policy of the allied 
Rumania against Hungary. In the night from 4 to 5 August 1919, the Peace 
Conference already could learn from the report of the French command of 
Nagy Kikinda that in the evening of 4 August, at six PM, the Rumanian 
army had marched into the capital of Hungary under the command of 
General Gheorge D. ???????????49 That means that on 5 August 1919, 
when the French chargé d’affaires to Bucharest finally conveyed the call 
of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference from 2 August to 
the Rumanian Government to stop immediately further advance of the
units of the royal Rumania in Hungary, the resolution of the Council re-
garding the need to stop the Rumanian units was already meaningless. 
With regard to the situation, the sole representative of an Entente Power in 
loco, Lieutenant Colonel Romanelli, could only bitterly state in his tele-
graphic report to Paris that the occupation of Budapest by the Rumanian 
army made it already impossible for the Hungarian Government to mani-
fest itself.50 The status of Peidl’s social-democratic government and the 
opportunities offered to it is documented by the official communication of 
the general staff of the Rumanian army stating: “Our army has occupied 
Budapest for strategic reasons today. Due to it, the whole Hungary, if oc-
cupied by us, is considered occupation territory.”51
The behaviour of the Rumanians certainly took the Peace Confer-
ence by surprise, although there had been some fears of similar develop-
ment from the beginning. That is evidenced also by the reaction of presi-
dent Clemenceau who, when discussing the Hungarian issue at the session 
of the Supreme Council on 5 August 1919, acknowledged that under the 
given circumstances, it was necessary to send a much more threatening 
note to Bucharest than the last one had been.52 Nevertheless, that did not 
48 Compare M. ORMOS, Padovától Trianonig. 1918–1920, Budapest, 1983 [1], p. 336 
and S. KONRÁD, Nemzeti önpusztítás. 1918–1920. (Forradalom–proletárdiktatúra–
ellenforradalom), Budapest, 2001, p. 179. Other acts of violence by the Rumanian units 
in Hungary were confirmed e.g. by Deleigne, the British commander (2 August 1919) or 
by Colby, the American envoy to Belgrade (4 August 1919). Compare ORMOS, p. 426.
49 The telegram was sent from the Nagy Kikinda French command half an hour before 
midnight on 4 August 1919 (ORMOS, p. 336).
50 For Romanelli’s telegram see FRUS PPC, VII., point 2 of the agenda of the session of 
SC PPC on 5 August 1919 [Situation in Hungary], p. 529.
51 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from Bucharest).
52 The minutes of the discussed session of SC PPC record the following with regard to 
Clemenceau: „... under the circumstances it might be desirable to send a more threating 
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happen and, instead of the discussion about the form of vigorous diplomat-
ic intervention of the Peace Conference at the Bucharest Government, the 
negotiations of the Council in the Hungarian-Rumanian matter focused 
only on final definition of the role of the inter-allied control mission of 
four Entente generals and agreement about its prompt sending to the ven-
ue, as the Italian foreign minister had urged the Council.53 Even Polk, the 
head of the American peace delegation, did not induce a more specific and 
sharper debate on the Hungarian-Rumanian issue, or more precisely on the 
unacceptable behaviour of the allied Rumanian army, although it was he 
who, according to the records from the relevant sessions of the Supreme 
Council, warned the most against the Rumanians and their self-confident 
policy.
Only the effort of Rumania to conclude bilateral armistice with 
Hungary after the occupation of Budapest by the Rumanian army, based 
on uncompromising unilateral dictate to Hungary, provoked sharper criti-
cism of the behaviour of the allied Rumania by the Supreme Council at its 
session of 6 August 1919. It was only then that the Peace Conference con-
demned for the first time clearly the occupation of Budapest by the Ruma-
nian units and it was even the president of the Peace Conference, the 
French Prime Minister Clemenceau, who expressed it. Nevertheless, the 
originally impassively formulated protest note to the Bucharest govern-
ment was stylistically moderated in the end, thanks to the lobbing of the 
Rumanian delegates to the conference, and even a reference to the legiti-
macy of the material demands of Rumania against Hungary, as compensa-
tion of the costs related to the intervention of the Rumanian royal army 
against the Hungarian Republic of Councils, was included into its text.54
But the issue of recognition or non-recognition of Peidl’s govern-
ment soon became pointless to the Peace Conference. Before the Peace 
Conference managed to understand the political turnover occurred in 
Hungary under the leadership of the pro-Entente social democrats, it was 
confronted with another, even more unbelievable interior political twist in 
the country. At the next session of the Supreme Council held on the fol-
lowing day, 7 August 1919, the Entente representatives to the Peace Con-
message than the one sent on the previous day.“ Compare FRUS PPC, VII., point 2 of 
the session of SC PPC on 5 August 1919, p. 529.
53 Tittoni should have stated the following in that connection: „… the moral of this was 
that the Military Commission should reach Budapest as soon as possible.“ FRUS PPC, 
VII., ibidem.
54 For the session of SC PPC on the Hungarian issue on 6 August 1919 see point 2 (Situa-
tion in Hungary) of the minutes of its session on that day: FRUS PPC, VII. pp. 548–555. 
For the note of SC PPC to the Bucharest Government see FRUS PPC, VII., p. 555 or 
DDFBC, II., p. 43 (note in French), or doc. No. 21, p. 43 (variant sent).
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ference were informed already about the unexpected turn of the internal 
development of Hungary in form of the Palace Putsch headed by the na-
tional-conservative political forces, resulting in self-proclaimed ascension 
of the new Hungarian Cabinet lead by István Friedrich.55 The sudden in-
ternal turn in Hungary was completed by the unexpected instalment of 
Josef Habsburg in the office of the head of state with the title homo regius,
or more precisely by the appointment of the new Hungarian Government 
by the new head of the state, Archduke Joseph Habsburg. The new situa-
tion in Hungary offered a much more complicated puzzle to the Peace 
Conference, with regard to the question how to unravel the Hungarian 
issue in such a manner that the Peace Treaty could be concluded also with 
Budapest, because now the government of Hungary was headed by Frie-
drich, a die-hard legitimistic politician, who criticized virulently not only 
the “opposition”, the civic-liberal and social-democratic political spectrum 
in the country but also the policy of the Entente Powers against Hungary. 
So the Paris Peace conference wasted, due to its sluggishness, the last and 
unique chance to support the restoration of the efforts of count Mihály 
Károlyi, the first post-war prime minister and later the first Hungarian 
president from the period before the declaration of the Hungarian Republic 
of Councils on 21 March 1919 to lay the foundations of democratic civic 
society in post-war Hungary in the manner of western democracies, that 
was then wasted to high degree by the lack of conceptuality of the policy 
of the Entente Powers towards Hungary already.
Abstract
On 1 August 1919, the “soviet” government of the Hungarian Republic of 
Councils was substituted by standard civic cabinet consisting of opposi-
tion trade union leaders (so called Gyula Peidl’s trade union cabinet) 
again. But its life was not long; it was in power only six days. The position 
of the cabinet was made difficult by the sluggishness of the Paris Peace 
Conference that did not want to recognize promptly the new Budapest 
Government and waited for its first steps. But the Entente Powers underes-
timated their ally, Rumania that made use of the chaotic situation in the 
country and occupied the capital of Hungary with its army during a few 
days, in spite of the disapproval of the Entente Powers of further military 
operations of the Rumanian units in Hungary after the fall of “Kun’s” re-
55 SC PPC in Paris had two telegrams informing about the internal turn in Budapest on 6 
August 1919 on the table on 7.8.1919. See the minutes to point No. 1 (Situation in Hun-
gary) to the session of SC PPC on 7 August 1919 In FRUS PPC, VII., pp. 603–607, or 
604–605 or DDFBC, II., doc. No. 26 [the referred point of the session of SC on 7 August 
1919 (Situation en Hongrie)], Annexes I and II, to the quoted document, p. 52 (General 
Gorton’s telegrams to SC PPC).
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gime. The insufficient foreign-political support of Peidl’s government, 
together with the chaotic internal situation in the country, multiplied with 
the military presence of the Rumanian army in the country, decapitated the 
post-soviet government finally on 6 August 1919.
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